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Abstract—Existing logic-locking attacks are known to success-
fully decrypt functionally correct key of a locked combinational
circuit. It is possible to extend these attacks to real-world Silicon-
based Intellectual Properties (IPs, which are sequential circuits)
through scan-chains by selectively initializing the combinational
logic and analyzing the responses. In this paper, we propose SeqL,
which achieves functional isolation and locks selective flip-flop
functional-input/scan-output pairs, thus rendering the decrypted
key functionally incorrect. We conduct a formal study of the
scan-locking problem and demonstrate automating our proposed
defense on any given IP. We show that SeqL hides functionally
correct keys from the attacker, thereby increasing the likelihood
of the decrypted key being functionally incorrect. When tested on
pipelined combinational benchmarks (ISCAS, MCNC), sequential
benchmarks (ITC) and a fully-fledged RISC-V CPU, SeqL gave
100% resilience to a broad range of state-of-the-art attacks includ-
ing SAT [1], Double-DIP [2], HackTest [3], SMT [4], FALL [5],
Shift-and-Leak [6] and Multi-cycle attacks [7].
Index Terms—IP Piracy, Logic Locking, Scan-chains
I. INTRODUCTION
Logic-locking is a solution that was touted to address IP
piracy threats in the semiconductor supply chain. This technique
adds key-gates with one input driven by secret key, to obfuscate
IP’s inner details. The transformation is reversed only upon
application of the programmed secret key, thus preserving the
IP’s original function. Unfortunately, logic-locking has been a
cat-and-mouse game where existing locking proposals [8]–[14]
fail to ever-advancing attacks [1]–[5]. Although these attacks
primarily target combinational circuits, they can be extended
to real-world sequential circuits through scan-chains. But the
fundamental attack assumption is that inputs are controllable
and outputs are observable. Thus, if the scan-chains are secured,
it would be possible to provide a secure logic locking solution.
This paper proposes SeqL, a new logic locking technique
that secures scan-chains. SeqL advances the prior work on
design-for-security (DFS) [7], [15], [16], by conducting a formal
study and empirically validating the security against a broad
class of state-of-the-art attacks. Although attacks on large-scale
sequential designs through functional execution is an open
problem, attacks through the scan-chains currently exist. Thus,
SeqL serves as the proper first line of defense. We demonstrate
how to automate SeqL and quantify its low overheads on large-
scale circuits. Therefore, SeqL addresses both the security and
practicality challenges of logic locking.
Figure 1 outlines the system we consider. We highlight a
simple setting for ease of explanation and elaborate later in our
threat model. We assume that the primary inputs and primary
outputs of the IP under consideration are not accessible, while
only the scan-chains are accessible to the attacker, in embedded
IP
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Fig. 1: Scan-based IP access for logic locking attacks.
deterministic test (EDT)-bypass mode. The input register Ri
applies primary inputs to the IP, and the output register Ro
stores the primary outputs. The scan-chain connects all flip-
flops in Ri, subsequently to the flip-flops internal to the IP and
finally the flip-flops in Ro. The scan-input (SI) and scan-output
(SO) ports are controllable and observable respectively by the
attacker. Hence, the attacker can apply selective inputs to the
IP and observe corresponding IP responses through these ports.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We identify there is 100% correlation between flip-flop
input (FI) locking and functional output corruption;
2) Exploiting this property, we propose SeqL, that: (a) iso-
lates functional path from the locked scan path; (b) locks
FIs and causes functional output corruption;
3) SeqL hides majority of the scan-correct keys which are
functionally correct, thus maximizing the probability of
the decrypted key being functionally incorrect;
4) The security of SeqL is also empirically evaluated and
verified against a broad set of best known attacks;
5) The small overheads of SeqL and its ease of implemen-
tation makes it attractive for industry practice.
II. PRIOR WORK
The first wave of logic locking techniques [8]–[10] have
been shown to be vulnerable to Boolean Satisfiability (SAT)
attack [1]. In SAT-attack, distinguishable input patterns (DIPs)
are obtained from the locked circuit and incorrect keys are
pruned-off based on oracle’s responses to the DIPs. Several
defenses were then proposed to mitigate SAT-attack, such as
Anti-SAT [13], SARLock [12] and Cyclic Obfuscation [17], but
they have failed to address the vulnerability to AppSAT [18],
Double-DIP [2], CycSAT [19], HackTest [3], BeSAT [20] and
machine-learning [21] attacks. While [22] proposes a new cyclic
logic locking technique to defend CycSAT [19], TTLock [11]
and Secure Function Logic Locking (SFLL) [14] were the only
locking schemes that were broadly resilient to these attacks, yet
they recently failed against functional analysis of logic locking
(FALL) [5] and SMT [4] attacks.
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Fig. 2: (a) EFF-style: Sample sequential circuit with logic locking and FO locking; (b) Scan-unrolled equivalent of Fig. 2(a); (c) SeqL-style:
Functional isolation and locked FIs/SQs; and (d) Scan-unrolled equivalent of Figure 2(c). SeqL considers flip-flops without feedback.
Additionally, to address the issue of defending against SAT-
attack on sequential circuits, several DFS techniques have been
proposed: (1) FORTIS [15], (2) Robust DFS (RDFS) [7] and
(3) Encrypt Flip-Flop (EFF) [16]. FORTIS [15] is vulnerable to
multi-cycle-test attacks [7] ; RDFS [7] addresses these issues but
necessitates routing of a global Test signal to all the key-based
scan flip-flops, adds significant overheads, vulnerable to shift-
and-leak [6] attack and increases test generation effort. EFF [16]
addresses these issues by locking scan flip-flip outputs (FOs).
But EFF is insecure against ScanSAT [23], thus there is a need
for a better defense that is both secure and practical.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section discusses the vulnerability of prior work on scan-
locking and highlights the threat model.
A. Scan-Locking [16] & State-of-the-Art Attacks [4], [5], [23]
In EFF technique [16], flip-flops (FFs) on the non-critical timing
paths of a sequential circuit are selected, and XOR/XNOR-
type key gates are added to lock the Q-outputs, which drive
combinational logic as well as the scan-chain. Figure 2(a) shows
a sample sequential circuit with 2 out of 4 FFs encrypted using
EFF-style scan-locking. In Figure 2(a):
• G0 and G1 are the primary inputs. SI and SO are the
circuit’s scan-input port and scan-output port respectively;
• FFs 1 and 2 have feedback, while FFs 3 and 4 do not have
feedback. G2, G4, G6 and G8 are corresponding FF inputs
(FIs) respectively. G3, G5, G7 and G9 are corresponding
FF outputs (FOs) respectively; and
• ck0 and ck1 are the combinational key bits, while fok0
and fok1 are key bits used to lock the FO G3 (XOR-type
key gate) and FO G5 (XNOR-type key gate) respectively.
ScanSAT [23] shows that it is possible to convert this
scan-locked instance to the scan-unrolled locked instance of
Figure 2(b), launch the SAT-attack on the unrolled instance and
decrypt the functionally correct sequential key. Here, in scan-
mode of operation: SI(G3) and SI(G5) are the scan-input-bits
corresponding to FFs 1 and 2 respectively; and ESO(G2) and
ESO(G4) are the locked-scan-output bits corresponding to FFs
1 and 2 respectively. Hence, EFF technique is not secure. Sim-
ilar to ScanSAT [23], it is possible to extend some of the state-
of-the-art attacks like HackTest-attack [3], functional-analysis-
attacks on logic-locking (FALL) [5], and SMT-attack [4]. We
thus evaluate SeqL on all these attacks.
B. Threat model
We consider a malicious foundry that offers fabrication, as-
sembly and testing services [24]. Thus, the attacker has access
to layout and mask information, and is thus able to reverse-
engineer the gate-level netlist. There are two possible sce-
narios: (1) The attacker uses an activated IC (oracle), and
applies scan patterns to the IP, and observes corresponding
scan responses in EDT-bypass mode. Since the IP is located
somewhere deep inside the SoC, we assume that the IP is
controllable/observable, only through scan-chains. Typically,
scan ports are not deactivated to facilitate debug of customer
returns, which the attacker exploits to launch the SAT-attack; or
(2) The attacker is at the outsourced tester, where the attacker
can place the dies in EDT-bypass mode, applies desired scan
patterns to the IP, and observes corresponding scan responses.
IV. SOLUTION INSIGHT
As discussed in the previous section, when SAT-attack is
launched on the scan-unrolled EFF-style scan-locked circuit, the
SAT solver returns the functionally correct key. In the discussion
that follows, we exploit the following principles:
1) In EFF-style scan-locking, the FO key-gate corresponding
to the FF appears both in the scan-input and scan-output
paths of the FF in the scan-unrolled instance;
2) Functional path can be isolated from the locked scan path
used by the attacker, thus achieving resilience;
3) To prevent vulnerability to multi-cycle-attack [7], it is
important to selectively lock FFs without feedback;
4) Since the FO key gates cascade with FI key gates to form
XOR/XNOR-chains, it is possible to obfuscate the solver.
Figure 2(c) shows the proposed SeqL-style scan-locking by
transforming the circuit in Figure 2(a), using above principles.
Figure 2(c) is different from Figure 2(a) in the following ways:
• There is a separate Q and SQ, and the key gate is added
at SQ (SQ key-gate), thus leaving the functional output
Q unencrypted. This is referred to as functional isolation;
• FFs without feedback e.g., 3 and 4 are selected for locking;
• sqk0 and sqk1 are the key bits used to lock the SQ output
of FFs 3 (with XOR-type key gate) and 4 (with XNOR-
type key gate) respectively; and
• Extra key gates (both of XOR type and without additional
obfuscation logic in this case, for ease of explanation) are
added to lock FIs of both these FFs, using fik0 and fik1
key bits respectively. These key gates are referred to as FI
key gates in the rest of this paper.
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Fig. 3: Abstract models for circuits in Figures 2(a) and 2(c)
Figure 2(d) shows the corresponding scan-unrolled equivalent
combinational circuit. The purple dashed line is the functional
boundary. This means that the key gates to the right of this
boundary (SQ key-gates) only affect scan-operation, and do not
affect normal functional operation of the circuit. This is because
the attacker uses the scan mode of operation, and hence ob-
serves ESO(G2) and ESO(G4). However, the circuit’s normal
functional operation is purely influenced by E(G2) and E(G4),
and hence the XOR/XNOR-chains (in red) cease to exist.
This renders the scan-correct decrypted key, being functionally
incorrect. After running SAT-attack on circuit in Figure 2(d),
when the combinational portions of the sequential circuit, the
original unencrypted sequential circuit and the solver key are
inputted to the formal equivalence checker, the result was
not equivalent. Hence, by functional isolation and FI locking,
resilience was achieved, thus making the proposed SeqL-style
scan-locking mechanism secure. Next subsection explains this
behavior using an abstract model.
A. Abstract model
Figure 3 shows an abstracted model of the sequential circuit,
with the combinational logic abstracted into a source-sink
circular vertex C, each FI key-gate abstracted into a blue circular
vertex, and each FF key-gate abstracted into a red rectangular
vertex. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show models corresponding to
circuits in Figures 2(a) and 2(c) respectively.
In the abstract model corresponding to the proposed scan-
locking shown in Figure 3(b), the following are functional paths:
• FP0 : fik0 −→ G7
• FP1 : fik1 −→ G9
and the following are scan-out paths:
• SP0 : fik0 −→ sqk0 −→ sqk
′
1
−→ SO
• SP1 : fik1 −→ sqk
′
1
−→ SO
Figure 3(b) shows that the number of inversions for the scan-
output-paths SP0 and SP1, are 2 and 0, respectively. Since
all scan-output-paths have even inversion parity, the proposed
locked circuit is correct for scan operation. However, for
functional paths, the number of inversions for FP0 and FP1,
are 1 and 0. Since functional path FP0 has odd-inversion-parity,
the circuit is incorrect for functional operation.
To understand the behavior systematically, Table I enumerates
all possibilities for the scan-lock {fik1, sqk
′
1
, f ik0, sqk0} for
the circuit in Figure 2(c). The rows in this table, that show
up as TRUE for the scan-correct column, are the possible
keys returned by the SAT-solver. Among the four functionally-
correct rows only one is scan-correct, thus SeqL hides 3
4
TABLE I. Truth table of our proposed scan-lock in Figure 2(c)
fik1 sqk
′
1
fik0 sqk0 Scan-Correct Functional-Correct
0 0 0 0 TRUE TRUE
0 0 0 1 FALSE TRUE
0 0 1 0 FALSE FALSE
0 0 1 1 TRUE FALSE
0 1 0 0 FALSE TRUE
0 1 0 1 FALSE TRUE
0 1 1 0 FALSE FALSE
0 1 1 1 FALSE FALSE
1 0 0 0 FALSE FALSE
1 0 0 1 FALSE FALSE
1 0 1 0 FALSE FALSE
1 0 1 1 FALSE FALSE
1 1 0 0 FALSE FALSE
1 1 0 1 TRUE FALSE
1 1 1 0 TRUE FALSE
1 1 1 1 FALSE FALSE
Fig. 4: Key Assignment Graph (KAG) for circuit in Figure 2(c). KAG
is a binary tree with dummy root node, the leaves of which correspond
to the rows in Table I whose scan-correctness column is TRUE.
functional-correct keys from the attacker. Similarly, among the
four scan-correct rows, only one is functionally correct, thus
SeqL maximizes the odds against the functionally-correct-key
among the scan-correct-keys. Figure 4 shows the corresponding
key assignment graph (KAG). The sequential key returned by
the solver is the second leaf from the left. Since this leaf is
a functionally incorrect key, the technique is able to achieve
resilience. In this example, odds against the functionally correct
key is p = 3
4
= 0.75.
B. Analysis
This section formally analyzes the security of logic locking
and proves that if SeqL is used to lock n flip-flops in the
sequential circuit, then the odds against the functionally-correct-
key among the scan-correct-keys equals 1 − 1
2n
, assuming the
attack is launched in EDT-bypass mode.
Given an FI-SQ key-pair {fiki, sqki}, there are 4 possible
assignments {00, 01, 10, 11}. Let n be the number of locked
FI-SQ pairs. Let KAG = (V,E) be a vertex-labelled edge-
weighted directed graph, where the vertices correspond to FI-
SQ pairs and the edges correspond to inversion parity. The
direction of edges is opposite to the scan-out-path direction.
In KAG, the children of every vertex at depth i from the root
correspond to ith flip-flop from the end of the scan-out-path.
All node and edge assignments are performed to ensure scan-
correctness.KAG is a tree, whose root vertex is a dummy node,
with exactly two children 00 and 11.
The labels on the vertices in KAG are 00, 01, 10 or 11,
corresponding to {fiki, sqki}, {fiki, sqk
′
i}, {fik
′
i, sqki} or
{fik
′
i, sqk
′
i} depending on whether FI key-gate, SQ key-gate
combination is {XOR, XOR}, {XOR, XNOR}, {XNOR,
XOR} or {XNOR, XNOR} respectively. 00 and 11 are even-
Fig. 5: Automating SeqL
parity vertices, whereas 01 and 10 are odd-parity vertices. The
children of 00 and 01 are even-parity vertices. The children of
10 and 11 are odd-parity vertices. Hence, every non-root vertex
has exactly 2 children. The possible weights on the edges in
KAG are 0 or 1, which signifies parity. The parity of an edge
signifies the presence/absence of signal-inversion at the child
flip-flop, which is same as the parity of the corresponding child
vertex. invk equals 0 or 1, depending on whether k
th flip-flop
along the scan-chain from the scan-output is locked with an
XOR or XNOR key-gate respectively.
Theorem 1: Parities of both edges of a vertex are identical.
Proof: Assume vertex vi in KAG at depth i. In order to ensure
scan-correctness, (fiki ⊕ sqki ⊕ invi) ⊕
∑i−1
k=1(sqkk ⊕ invk)
should equal 0. If
∑i−1
k=1(sqkk ⊕ invk) equals 0,
(fiki ⊕ sqki ⊕ invi) becomes 0 (possible children of vi
are 00 and 11, in both cases parity of edge is 0).
On the other hand, if
∑i−1
k=1(sqkk ⊕ invk) equals 1,
(fiki ⊕ sqki ⊕ invi) becomes 1 (possible children of vi
are 01 and 10, in both cases parity of edge is 1). Thus, parity
of left and right edges of a vertex are identical, hence the proof.
Theorem 2: KAG is a binary tree.
Proof: Root vertex has exactly two children. Additionally, every
non-root vertex has exactly two children. Since every vertex
has exactly two children,KAG is a binary tree, hence the proof.
Theorem 3: The odds against the functionally-correct-key
among the scan-correct-keys is p = 1− 1
2n
Proof: The path from root to a functionally correct leaf
should have all 00 nodes, there is exactly one such leaf in
KAG. Since, the total number of leaves in KAG = 2n, odds
p = 2
n
−1
2n
= 1− 1
2n
, hence the proof.
V. AUTOMATING SEQL DEFENSE
So far, we have seen the effectiveness of SeqL in defending
attacks on scan locking. This section shows how to automate
SeqL, so that it can be practically deployed on large circuits.
Objective: Lock selective scan flip-flops (FI-SQ pairs) without
feedback such that functional output corruption is achieved,
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Fig. 6: Flip-flop variants for scan-locking
while area-overhead is minimized.
Solution: The likelihood of functional output corruption is
maximized with increase in p = 1− 1
2n
, whereas area-overhead
increases linearly with n. Hence, the chances of functional out-
put corruption increases rapidly with n, with minimal increase
in area overhead. Figure 5 shows SeqL flow, which exploits this
principle to iteratively lock scan flip-flops (FI-SQ pairs) from
the end of the scan-chain(s) until functional output is corrupted.
Thus, the proposed scan-locking solution has two parts:
1) An functionally-isolated scan-locked flip-flop design.
2) An iterative FI-SQ locking algorithm.
A. Functionally-isolated scan-locked flip-flop design
We define the sequential key to be K = {Kc,Kfi,Ksq},
where Kc, Kfi and Ksq are portions of the key that lock the
combinational logic (excluding the FIs), the FIs and the SQs
respectively. In EFF technique, all these components influence
the sequential circuit’s normal functional operation. Figure 6(a)
shows the EFF-style scan-locking scheme, where the FO key
gate output, is broadcasted to Scan-Q (referred to as SQ in
the figure), as well as Functional-Q (referred to as FQ in the
figure). The proposed isolation-based scan-locking is shown in
Figure 6(b), which isolates the functional path from the locked
scan path. Hence, the SQ key gate locks only SQ and has
no influence on FQ. Thus, in the proposed SeqL technique,
only Kc and Kfi influence (while Ksq has no effect on) the
sequential circuit’s normal functional operation. This assists in
returning the functionally incorrect key, thus aiding in functional
output corruption when applied with the key returned by the
SAT-solver. There is an additional transmission gate added to
this structure in the scan path to avoid toggling of the locking
key gate along the scan path. Although this adds 2 extra
transistors per flip-flop, the overhead is marginal compared to
the benefit of savings obtained in Energy-Per-Toggle (EPT ) of
the flip-flop during normal functional operation, similar to CSP-
scan [25]. The comparison of area, timing and EPT of the EFF
as well as SeqL flip-flops are provided later in Section VI.
B. Iterative key pushing algorithm (IKPA) for pipelined combi-
national circuits
Algorithm 1 shows the iterative key gate pushing algorithm, that
takes a logic-locked combinational circuit with pipeline stages
both at its inputs and outputs. Since the circuit already has
key gate overhead, to avoid any further overhead, the algorithm
iteratively pushes some of the key gates inside combinational
logic to the output boundary. We measure the success of
the IKPA algorithm using formal equivalence checking. If the
Algorithm 1: Iterative key pushing algorithm for pipelined
logic-locked combinational circuits
Input: C
while C
′
= C do
Identify a combinational key gate pair kc, an unvisited
FI-SQ pair for a flip-flop without feedback kb and
mark corresponding kb as visited ;
Push kc to kb;
Run SAT-solver and update Kfi, C
′
;
end
Result: C
′
, Kfi
Algorithm 2: Iterative boundary locking algorithm for se-
quential circuits
Input: S, Ksq
while S
′
= S and |Kfi|+ |Ksq| <= γ do
Identify an unvisited FI-SQ pair for a FF without
feedback and mark corresponding pair as visited ;
Obfuscate corresponding FI-SQ pair;
Run SAT-solver and update Kfi, S
′
;
end
Result: S
′
, Kfi
returned solver key makes the two circuits different or in other
words not equivalent, then we are successful i.e., functional
output corruption is achieved. Additionally, even with SeqL, we
have found that in all the cases, the decrypted Kc is correct.
Hence, it is only Kfi, that causes functional output corruption.
Section VI demonstrates the detailed results.
C. Iterative boundary locking algorithm (IBLA) for sequential
circuits
Unlike pipelined logic-locked combinational circuits, there are
no existing key gates for sequential circuits. Hence, FI-SQ
locking or in other words, boundary locking has to be done
afresh. Moreover, since Kc is always successfully decrypted,
combinational logic except FIs is not locked to ensure cost-
effectiveness. Since the higher the number of inserted key
gates at the FI-SQ boundary, the higher the area overhead,
we make this parameter, γ, user-configurable. Algorithm 2
takes a sequential benchmark as input, and iteratively obfuscates
unvisited FI-SQ pairs with XOR/XNOR-type key-gates, until
functional output corruption is achieved or |Kfi|+ |Ksq| > γ.
Since the implementation is simple and security is achieved with
low overheads, this is attractive for industry practice.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We validate the security of SeqL against a multitude of state-of-
the-art attacks and quantify its reduced overheads compared to
prior work. This analysis confirms our claims on genericness,
robustness, and scalability of SeqL. Algorithms 2 (IBLA) and 1
(IKPA) were used for scan-locking the sequential benchmarks
and pipelined combinational benchmarks, respectively. Both the
locking algorithms were implemented in Perl. Since the locking
algorithm execution times across all the benchmarks were very
small (matter of seconds), the execution times were not reported.
TABLE II. Resilience of SeqL for Pipelined Combinational Bench-
marks for 5% logic locking. ’✔’ is secure and ’✖’ is insecure.
Bench. RND DAC’12 ToC’13/xor ToC’13/mux
EFF SeqL EFF SeqL EFF SeqL EFF SeqL
apex2 ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
apex4 ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
i4 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
i7 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
i8 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
i9 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
seq ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
k2 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
ex1010 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
dalu ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
des ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
c432 ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
c499 ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
c880 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
c1355 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔
c1908 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
c3540 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
c5315 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
c7552 ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖ ✔
TABLE III. Resilience of SeqL against state-of-the-art attacks on
pipelined combinational benchmarks.
Oracle-guided Oracle-less
Bench. DDIP [2] SS [23] SMT [4] HT [3] FALL [5]
apex2 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
apex4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ NK
i4 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
i7 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
i8 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
i9 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
seq ✔ − ✔ − ✔
k2 − ✔ − ✔ ✔
ex1010 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ NK
dalu ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
des − ✔ NK ✔ ✔
c432 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
c499 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
c880 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
c1355 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
c1908 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
c3540 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
c5315 − ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
c7552 NK ✔ NK ✔ ✔
All experiments are run on IBM BladeCenter® Cluster with abort-limit
of 1 week. ’✔’ is secure and ’✖’ is insecure. ’-’ indicates decryption
time exceeds abort-limit, while ’NK’ indicates No-Key.
A. Resilience of SeqL vs. EFF [16] against SAT-Attacks on
pipelined combinational benchmarks
Table II shows the results of applying the procedure shown
earlier in Figure 5 on 4 different encryption schemes validated
in [1], and compared against EFF [16]. This table shows that
SeqL secured all sequential circuits against SAT-attack in 100%
of the cases. As explained in Section IV, (1) Kc was success-
fully decrypted in all cases, while (2) Kfi was incorrect, hence
causing functional output corruption, thus achieving resilience.
Results on IOLTS′14 encryption scheme [1], [10] gave 0%
resilience in EFF case and 100% resilience in SeqL case, across
all benchmarks, hence not reported in Table II for brevity.
B. Resilience of scan-unrolled versions of SeqL-locked design
to state-of-the-art attacks on logic locking
Table III confirms the resilience of SeqL-locked design
to state-of-the-art attacks on logic locking like Double-DIP
(DDIP) [2], ScanSAT (SS) [23], HackTest (HT)-attack [3],
functional-analysis-attacks on logic-locking (FALL) [5],
and SMT-attack [4]. All experiments were run on IBM
BladeCenter® Cluster, with an abort-limit of 1 week. Those
entries in the table which are empty, correspond to all those
TABLE IV. Resilience of SeqL for Sequential Circuits. The Scan-locking was done using IBLA algorithm.
Bench. #Gates #SFFs #SCs |Rwof | EFF [16] SeqL
Resilience Decryption Time
Res. Ov. n p Ov. N=1 N=2 N=5 N=1 N=2 N=5
b14 10,012 245 3 54 ✖ 3.3% 8 0.99 0.24 % ✔ ✔ ✔ 19 min 2 min 2 min
b15 12,992 449 5 70 ✖ 4.3 % 9 0.99 0.2 % ✔ ✔ ✔ 47 min 11 min 164 min
b17 32,192 1,415 15 97 ✖ 5.2 % 6 0.99 0.05 % ✔ ✔ ✔ 10 min 17 hrs. 47 hrs.
b18 114561 3,320 34 23 ✖ 3.8 % 10 0.99 0.03 % ✔ − − 53 hrs. > abort-limit > abort-limit
b19 231,266 6,642 67 30 ✖ 3.7 % 10 0.99 0.01 % ✔ − − 91 hrs. > abort-limit > abort-limit
b20 20,172 490 5 22 ✖ 3.3 % 10 0.99 0.15 % ✔ ✔ ✔ 7 min. 15 min. 37 min.
b21 20,517 490 5 22 ✖ 3.2 % 10 0.99 0.15 % ✔ ✔ ✔ 6 min. 34 min. 36 min.
b22 29,897 735 8 22 ✖ 3.3 % 10 0.99 0.1 % ✔ ✔ ✔ 11 min. 37 min. 67 min
RISC-V flat. 25,096 2,031 20 226 ✖ 7.9 % 10 0.99 0.09 % ✔ ✔ ✔ 2 min. 13 min. 6 hrs.
1 N denotes the number of capture cycles in the multi-cycle scan-based test. The scan flip-flops without feedback, Rwof , are stitched by designer as a
separate scan-chain for security considerations. IBM BladeCenter® Cluster with abort limit of 1 week is used. ’✔’ is secure and ’✖’ is insecure.
cases which have crossed this abort-limit while performing key
decryption. Similarly, for some cases the solver returns No-key
(indicated as NK in the table). The resilience verification flow
for oracle-guided attacks is similar to the flow in Figure 5.
For the oracle-less attacks, the resilience verification flow is
slightly different because of absence of the oracle, however
lcmp verifier is still used for formal-equivalence-checking.
C. Resilience of SeqL vs. EFF against SAT-Attacks on sequen-
tial benchmarks
Table IV shows the results of applying the procedure shown
in Figure 5 on ITC’99 open-source sequential gate-level bench-
marks and flattened RISC-V CPU netlist. The RISC-V CPU
RTL is obtained from [26], and gate-level synthesis is performed
using Nangate 45nm library using Synopsys Design Compiler®.
Scan chains and EDT-compression are inserted into the gate-
level netlist using Mentor Graphics TestKompress® (decom-
pressor and compactor will not be used because the attack is
launched in EDT-bypass mode).
The scan-inserted gate-level-verilog is converted to the
bench format used in the attack tools, using an in-house
Python script. The attack tools only support basic gates
like AND/OR/NAND/NOR/XOR/XNOR/NOT/BUF/MUX, how-
ever the RISC-V gate-level-verilog contains more complex gates
like AOI (and-or-invert), OAI (or-and-invert), HA (half-adder)
and FA (full-adder). Our Python script internally converts each
of these complex gates into a composition of basic gates, before
final conversion to bench, which is acceptable because IBLA
algorithm inserts scan-locks and does not affect combinational
logic. The compression hardware is not converted because
the attacks are meant to be launched in EDT-bypass mode.
The columns #SFFs, #SCs, Res. and Ov. indicate number of
scan flip-flops, number of scan-chains, resilience and overhead
respectively. The resilience rate of EFF was 0%, while that of
SeqL was 100%, thus indicating the superiority of SeqL over
EFF. An abort limit of 1 week was used for key decryption.
D. Resilience to Multi-cycle attacks [7]
So far, we discussed attacks using a single capture cycle.
The attacker can also run the circuit for N > 1 capture cycles
(multi-cycle test), without affecting the shift cycles. This attack
can be modeled by time-unrolling the reverse-engineered netlist
as well as the oracle N times. Since scan-in and scan-out
phases span hundreds of clock cycles and N is in general
relatively very small, running at slow-speed or at-speed will not
significantly affect test-time/attack-time. Table IV shows results
for this attack. Similar to single-cycle attack (N = 1), SeqL was
resilient to multi-cycle attack (N = 2, 5) across all benchmarks.
TABLE V. Area, Timing and Energy Overhead Comparison
FF # Ts Tsetup TCK−to−Q % Inc. EPT % Inc.
Orig. 38 45ps 113ps - 13.1fJ -
EFF 48 45ps 163ps 44% 17.1fJ 31%
SeqL 50 45ps 127ps 12% 13.9fJ 6%
For EFF , since key is successfully recovered for N = 1 itself,
resilience results for N > 1 were not shown.
E. Resilience to Shift-and-Leak attack (SaLa) [6]
RDFS [7] inserts special secure cells (SCs) into scan-chains
to drive the key-gates. Unlike RDFS, SeqL key-gates are directly
driven by the tamper-proof memory, without SCs in between.
The first goal of SaLa is to find leaky cells, and shift the content
of SCs into leaky cells. Due to absence of SCs in SeqL, this first
goal is never achieved. The second goal of SaLa is to find the
leak condition and satisfy it. Since SeqL locks the scan-chain
itself, it is mandatory to know the scan-key upfront to invoke
test generator and find the leak condition. Since the goal is itself
key-decryption, it is not possible to find the leak condition, let
alone satisfy it. Thus, SeqL is inherently resilient to SaLa.
F. Overheads
Table V shows the comparison of area, timing and energy
for original, EFF -style and proposed SeqL-style locked scan
flip-flops, obtained using SPICE transistor-level simulation.
NGSPICE open-source simulator, Nangate 45nm library
scan flip-flop and 45nm predictive technology model was used
to arrive at these results. From Table V, it is evident that
the proposed SeqL flip-flop has 22% and 19% reduction in
TCK−to−Q and Energy-Per-Toggle (EPT ) respectively, with
only 4% area overhead as compared to EFF flip-flop.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed SeqL, that performs functional isolation
and FI-SQ locking. SeqL hides a major fraction of the function-
ally correct keys, thus maximizing functional output corruption.
We have shown both the theoretical and empirical improvements
in the security of scan-locking. The results have shown 100%
resilience to state-of-the-art oracle-guided as well as oracle-less
attacks. Furthermore, since combinational key (excluding FIs)
is completely recovered, it is sufficient to lock FI-SQ pairs,
making SeqL cost-efficient. Moreover, we have demonstrated
SeqL on large designs such as RISC-V CPU, demonstrating
its applicability in mainstream industry practice.
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